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Distributed Hypothesis Testing with
Social Learning and Symmetric Fusion
Joong Bum Rhim and Vivek K Goyal
Abstract—We study the utility of social learning in a dis-
tributed detection model with agents sharing the same goal:
a collective decision that optimizes an agreed upon criterion.
We show that social learning is helpful in some cases but
is provably futile (and thus essentially a distraction) in other
cases. Specifically, we consider Bayesian binary hypothesis testing
performed by a distributed detection and fusion system, where all
decision-making agents have binary votes that carry equal weight.
Decision-making agents in the team sequentially make local de-
cisions based on their own private signals and all precedent local
decisions. It is shown that the optimal decision rule is not affected
by precedent local decisions when all agents observe conditionally
independent and identically distributed private signals. Perfect
Bayesian reasoning will cancel out all effects of social learning.
When the agents observe private signals with different signal-to-
noise ratios, social learning is again futile if the team decision
is only approved by unanimity. Otherwise, social learning can
strictly improve the team performance. Furthermore, the order
in which agents make their decisions affects the team decision.
Index Terms—Bayesian hypothesis testing, decision fusion,
distributed detection, sequential decision making, social learning
I. INTRODUCTION
Consider a team of three physicians, Alexis, Britta, and
Carol, who together diagnose a patient and make a decision,
say between medication and surgery. Each physician individ-
ually examines the patient or runs medical tests within her
expertise before the team aggregates the individual opinions.
The team would make the best decision if the physicians
could share every result and discuss how to treat the patient.
This would be as if the agents send their observations in
full to a fusion center, which is able to use a sophisticated
integration rule, as depicted in Fig. 1a. However, this level
of communication costs a lot of time and resources, and this
architecture assumes the ability to jointly interpret the totality
of information.
A more common way to aggregate opinions of human
decision makers is through some form of voting. In fact, a
patient may seek the opinions of three physicians and decide
according to the majority, with no interaction among the
physicians, as depicted in Fig. 1b. This is a typical distributed
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(a) Centralized detection.
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(b) Conventional distributed detection.
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(c) Focus of this paper.
Fig. 1. Examples of group decision making. (a) Agents observe private
signals and send them to the fusion center for centralized detection. (b) Agents
observe private signals, make local decisions in a distributed matter, and send
their decisions to the fusion center. (c) Agents observe private signals, make
local decisions sequentially using all available information, and send their
decisions to later-acting agents and to the fusion center. Sending decisions to
later-acting agents is termed public voting.
detection model. The optimal local decision-making strategy
in such model has been studied for decades [1], [2].
In some settings, people share their opinions and thus can
affect the opinions of others. In the medical example, the
patient may see the physicians in sequence, and the recommen-
dation (medication or surgery) of a physician may be known
to each later-consulted physician when she is making her
own recommendation. A simple example is shown in Fig. 1c.
The effect of this interaction among decision-making agents—
under certain assumptions that are adopted for tractability—is
the focus of this paper.
In our model, agents make decisions in a predetermined
order and later-acting agents can observe all or some of the
decisions made by earlier-acting agents. The local decisions
ar
X
iv
:1
40
4.
09
64
v2
  [
cs
.IT
]  
4 A
pr
 20
14
2 DISTRIBUTED HYPOTHESIS TESTING WITH SOCIAL LEARNING AND SYMMETRIC FUSION
are also called public signals because they are shown to
multiple agents, unlike the private signals. The later-acting
agents can perform Bayesian reasoning to learn some infor-
mation from the public signals and make better local decisions.
This process of incorporating information from other agents
is called social learning. We will see that social learning
provides no improvement when the agents have conditionally
independent and identically distributed (iid) private signals;
otherwise there is generally an improvement, and the degree
of improvement depends on the order in which the agents
make their decisions.
A. Relations to Previous Work
Mathematical study of social learning was introduced in [3],
[4]. These papers discussed decision-making agents who make
decisions in a predetermined order and for individually max-
imizing their own utilities. They presented models where
choices made by all agents are observed by all other agents as
public signals. In these models, herding behavior—that agents
ignore private signals and adopt public signals—arises after
several earlier-acting agents choose the same alternative. It
was later shown that incorrect herding occurs with a nonzero
probability if the private signals are boundedly informative.1
Otherwise, asymptotically a sequence of agents will converge
to the correct choice [5].
This work is unique from previous works in that we study
social learning in a team decision-making scenario with a
symmetric fusion of the local decisions. The fusion by voting
makes an earlier-acting agent important not only because she
influences later-acting agents but also because her vote counts
in the fusion rule. We ask whether it is beneficial for the agents
to share their local decisions among themselves. The agents
in this work perform Bayesian reasoning, and there is a rich
literature that suggests this to be a good approximation to
human behavior [6]–[10].
Note that we consider agents who share a common goal.
The social learning in previous works occurs among agents
that have individual goals and behave selfishly to achieve
their own goals. Social learning is helpful in this case if the
private signals are unbounded [5] even though the selfishness
diminishes the efficiency of social learning [11]. Chamley et
al. [12] also state that social learning yields a lower rate of
learning than collaboration does. They compare social learning
by selfish agents to distributed detection by collaborating
agents but do not consider social learning by collaborating
agents. In contrast, we are considering social learning and
distributed detection together in one model.
When the agents’ private signals are not conditionally iid,
we find that the order in which the agents make their deci-
sions can affect the collective performance. The ordering that
maximizes the amount of information transferred to the fusion
center was studied previously in the case when agents observe
binary private signals by Ottaviani and Sørenson [13]. They
state that for a given group of heterogeneous expert agents, the
order in which the agents speak matters. The same statement
1A signal Y generated under a state H is called boundedly informative if
there exists κ > 0 such that κ < fY |H(y |h) < 1/κ for all y and h.
holds in our model even though the agents in our model have a
different motivation than the agents in the previous model, who
pursue only the personal goal of improving their reputations.
The importance of ordering is also pointed out in [14].
Our preliminary work [15] compares private voting to public
voting in which all agents observe the full history of previous
decisions and the agents observe conditionally iid private
signals. It is shown that public voting does not improve
performance. Intuitively, one might think that social learning
helps later-acting agents make better local decisions, leading
to improvement of the team decision; however, this intuition
is shown to be wrong.
This paper builds upon the preliminary results in [15].
We extend our interest to more general models. We allow
the likelihoods for the agents’ private signals to differ. Also,
agents may observe only some of previous decisions, such
as a decision made by the agent just before themselves in a
sequence [2] or local decisions made by their neighbors in a
specific network [16].
All discussions in this paper do not require that private
signals are equal to the hypothesis corrupted by additive or
Gaussian noises. Agents observe private signals with likeli-
hood functions that are different under state 0 and state 1. All
we need is that their likelihood ratios are strictly monotonic,
which is a rather natural requirement.
B. Outline
Section II formally describes our decision-making model.
Section III provides results for agents observing conditionally
iid private signals. Section IV generalizes the model to agents
with differing private signal likelihoods and provides examples
of helpful social learning. Section V summarizes our results
and discusses limitations and extensions of our model.
II. PROBLEM STATEMENT
Consider a distributed detection and decision fusion system
with N agents: Alexis, Britta, Carol, Diana, . . . , Norah. We
also number the agents 1, 2, . . . , N ; names and numbers are
used as convenient. Together, the agents perform a binary hy-
pothesis test to detect H ∈ {0, 1}, which has prior probability
distribution p0 = P{H = 0} and p1 = P{H = 1} = 1 − p0.
Agent n observes a private signal Yn about the true state
H = h, with likelihood function fYn|H(yn |h), as shown
in Fig. 2. The private signals {Yn}Nn=1 are conditionally
independent given H . We assume that the likelihood ratios
fYn|H(yn | 1)/fYn|H(yn | 0) are monotonically increasing.
In our model, Agent n makes local decision Ĥn ∈ {0, 1}
or, equivalently, quantizes her private signal into 0 or 1, and
sends it to a fusion center. The fusion center uses a fixed and
symmetric rule to aggregate the local decisions:
Ĥ =
{
1, if
∑N
n=1 Ĥn ≥ L;
0, otherwise,
(1)
for some L ∈ {1, 2, . . . , N}. We call this the L-out-of-N
fusion rule and call the result of the fusion Ĥ a team decision.
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Fig. 2. The distributed detection and decision fusion model considered in
this paper. Local decisions are sent not only to the fusion center but also to
following agents as public signals.
The goodness criterion for the decision making is the Bayes
risk (mean decision-making cost):
R = c10p0P{Ĥ = 1 |H = 0}+ c01p1P{Ĥ = 0 |H = 1},
(2)
where c10 denotes the cost of a false alarm or Type I error—
detecting H = 0 as Ĥ = 1—and c01 denotes the cost of a
missed detection or Type II error—detecting H = 1 as Ĥ =
0. We assume that a correct decision induces no cost. The
agents are a team in the sense of Radner [17]: they share the
same decision-making costs and the same goal, which is to
minimize (2).
Each Bayesian agent performs a likelihood ratio test (LRT)
to make optimal local decisions [2], [18]. The test chooses
the hypothesis Ĥn = 1 if the likelihood ratio is greater than
a certain threshold, which is determined by the information
the agent has, such as the prior probability, decision-making
costs, and the number of agents. Since we are assuming
monotonically increasing likelihood ratios, we can express the
LRT in a compact form:
yn
Ĥn(yn)=1
R
Ĥn(yn)=0
λn, (3)
where we call λn a decision threshold.
Each agent generates a local decision Ĥn after the LRT. Her
decision may be a false alarm or a missed detection, which
have probabilities P Ie,n and P
II
e,n, respectively:
P Ie,n = P{Ĥn = 1 |H = 0}, (4)
P IIe,n = P{Ĥn = 0 |H = 1}. (5)
From the L-out-of-N fusion rule, we can compute the prob-
abilities of false alarm and of missed detection of the team
decision, P IE and P
II
E :
P IE = P
{
Ĥ = 1 |H = 0
}
= P
{∑N
n=1 Ĥn ≥ L |H = 0
}
=
N∑
n=L
∑
I⊆[N]
|I|=n
∏
i∈I
P Ie,i
∏
j∈[N ]\I
(
1− P Ie,j
)
,
P IIE = P
{
Ĥ = 0 |H = 1
}
= P
{∑N
n=1 Ĥn < L |H = 1
}
=
N∑
n=N−L+1
∑
I⊆[N]
|I|=n
∏
i∈I
P IIe,i
∏
j∈[N ]\I
(
1− P IIe,j
)
,
where [N ] denotes the set {1, 2, . . . , N}. The Bayes risk (2)
can be rewritten as
R = c10p0P
I
E + c01p1P
II
E . (6)
Note that this is the team’s Bayes risk, which is the only
goodness criterion considered here; agents do not minimize a
personal Bayes risk.
In a decision-making task, the agents make decisions se-
quentially in the preordained order of Alexis, Britta, Carol,
through Norah. Through most of the paper, each of these
agents can observe all previous local decisions.2 For example,
Britta can observe Alexis’s decision Ĥ1; Carol can observe
Britta’s decision Ĥ2 as well Ĥ1; and so on. We call the local
decisions observed by other agents public signals.
Later-acting agents have more degrees of freedom in choos-
ing their decision thresholds because the decision thresholds
may depend on the observed public signals. Britta has two
degrees of freedom: she can apply different thresholds when
Ĥ1 = 0 and when Ĥ1 = 1. Likewise, Carol has four degrees
of freedom because she observes one of four public signal
combinations (Ĥ1, Ĥ2) ∈ {(0, 0), (0, 1), (1, 0), (1, 1)}. We
use superscripts to specify the public signals that an agent
observes. For example, λ02 denotes Britta’s decision threshold
when she observes Ĥ1 = 0 and λ013 denotes Carol’s decision
threshold when she observes (Ĥ1, Ĥ2) = (0, 1). Furthermore,
P I1e,2 denotes Britta’s Type I error probability when Ĥ1 = 1
and P II10e,3 denotes Carol’s Type II error probability when
(Ĥ1, Ĥ2) = (1, 0).
In this paper, we will compare the optimal performance
in the case when agents can observe public signals—called
public voting—to the case when they cannot—called secret
voting—so as to analyze to what extent the public signals are
beneficial.
III. IDENTICAL AGENTS
Agents are assumed to observe conditionally iid private
signals in this section. We compare the optimal decision-
making strategies in two cases: public voting and secret voting.
By showing that the optimal decision thresholds are the same
in these two cases, we will conclude that public signals are
useless.
In secret voting, we can restrict the agents to use identi-
cal decision thresholds to simplify the problem [15]. Using
2In Section III-B, we consider incomplete public signals.
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identical decision thresholds is asymptotically optimum for
the binary hypothesis testing problem [1]. Furthermore, by
numerical experiments, it turns out that constraining to iden-
tical decision rules causes little or no loss of performance for
finite N and the corresponding optimal fusion rule has the L-
out-of-N form [19]. Our numerical experiments (not reported
here) for fixed L-out-of-N fusion rules and conditionally iid
private signals show that the optimal decision thresholds are
in fact identical for any N ≤ 7 for Gaussian and exponential
likelihood functions.
A. Complete Public Signals
Suppose that agents can observe all decisions made by
previous agents. Specifically, Agent n observes Ĥ1, . . . , Ĥn−1
before making her decision.
First, let us consider the simplest case of N = 2. Alexis
and Britta make a decision together and their fusion rule is
the 1-out-of-2 (OR) rule or the 2-out-of-2 (AND) rule. In secret
voting, Alexis and Britta simultaneously make local decisions.
They use one decision threshold each.
On the other hand, in public voting Alexis first makes a
decision and then Britta makes a decision upon observing
Alexis’s decision. As always, Alexis has a single decision
threshold. Britta also has only one relevant decision threshold,
like in secret voting. While Britta seems to be able to choose
two decision thresholds, one for Ĥ1 = 0 and another for
Ĥ1 = 1, for each fusion rule there is one value of the
public signal for which her decision becomes irrelevant to
the team decision: under the OR rule, when Ĥ1 = 1 the
team decision is Ĥ = 1 regardless of Britta’s local decision;
and under the AND rule, when Ĥ1 = 0 the team decision is
Ĥ = 0 regardless of Britta’s local decision. Thus, both agents
equally have one degree of freedom even when the voting is
public. This captures the basic idea behind public voting and
secret voting yielding the same performance for N = 2. We
provide a more technical proof below. To draw attention to
the distinction between the two cases, we use λ to denote
decision thresholds in secret voting and ρ to denote those in
public voting.
Theorem 1: The existence of public signals does not affect
the optimal local decision rules for N = 2 under either of the
two L-out-of-N fusion rules.
Proof: The fusion rule will be the 1-out-of-2 (OR) rule or
the 2-out-of-2 (AND) rule. Let us compare team Bayes risks
in the secret voting and public voting cases under the OR rule.
In the secret voting scenario, the Bayes risk is given by
Rs = c10p0
(
P Ie,1 +
(
1− P Ie,1
)
P Ie,2
)
+ c01p1P
II
e,1P
II
e,2, (7)
where Alexis’s decision threshold λ1 determines local error
probabilities P Ie,1 and P
II
e,1, and Britta’s decision threshold
λ2 determines local error probabilities P
I
e,2 and P
II
e,2. Their
optimal decision thresholds λ∗1 and λ
∗
2 minimize (7).
In the public voting scenario, the Bayes risk is in the same
form
Rp = c10p0
(
P Ie,1 +
(
1− P Ie,1
)
P I0e,2
)
+ c01p1P
II
e,1P
II0
e,2 , (8)
except that Britta’s error probabilities, P I0e,2 and P
II0
e,2 , are
controlled by her decision threshold ρ02 for Ĥ1 = 0. Britta’s
decision threshold when Ĥ1 = 1, ρ12, is irrelevant; thus, we
can assume that ρ12 = ρ
0
2 without loss of optimality.
Expressions (7) and (8) are very similar; the only difference
is the replacement of (P Ie,2, P
II
e,2) in (7) by (P
I0
e,2 , P
II0
e,2 ) in (8).
Now note that the set of achievable values for (P Ie,2, P
II
e,2)
and (P I0e,2 , P
II0
e,2 ) are identical; they are achieved by varying
Britta’s decision threshold (λ2 or ρ02) in precisely the same
local decision-making problem. Therefore, minimizing Rs and
Rp results in equal Bayes risks, and these are achieved with
decision thresholds satisfying the following:
ρ∗1 = λ
∗
1, ρ
0∗
2 = λ
∗
2. (9)
Since λ∗1 = λ
∗
2, we also have ρ
∗
1 = ρ
0∗
2 . Therefore, Alexis and
Britta should not change their decision thresholds depending
on whether or not the voting is public.
The proof for the AND fusion rule is similar. While the
precise expressions for Rs and Rp change, again we find
that the achievable set of local Type I and Type II error
probabilities are identical under secret and public voting, so
the minima and optimum decision thresholds are unaffected
by the public signal.
For larger N , we prove the lack of usefulness of the public
signal by mathematical induction.
Theorem 2: Suppose that sharing local decisions does not
change Alexis’s decision threshold (i.e., ρ∗1 = λ
∗
1). If the
optimal decision-making rules are the same in public voting
and in secret voting for a specific N and any K-out-of-N
fusion rule, then it is also true for a team of N+1 agents and
any L-out-of-(N+1) fusion rule.
Proof: First, we consider the secret voting scenario with
N+1 agents. Since Agent n’s decision is critical only if the
other N local decisions are L−1 ones and N−L+1 zeros, the
optimal decision threshold λ∗n is the solution to
3
fYn|H(λn | 1)
fYn|H(λn | 0)
=
c10p0
(
N
L−1
) (
P Ie
)L−1 (
1− P Ie
)N−L+1
c01p1
(
N
N−L+1
)
(P IIe )
N−L+1
(1− P IIe )L−1
=
c10p0
(
P Ie
)L−1 (
1− P Ie
)N−L+1
c01p1 (P IIe )
N−L+1
(1− P IIe )L−1
, (10)
where we use that P Ie,1 = P
I
e,2 = · · · = P Ie and P IIe,1 = P IIe,2 =
· · · = P IIe because the optimal decision thresholds of all agents
are identical in secret voting.
Next, in the public voting scenario, we can classify error
cases depending on Alexis’s detection result, e.g., when the
true state is 0 and Alexis’s decision is correct (Ĥ1 = 0), a
false alarm occurs if at least L out of the remaining N agents
vote for 1. The Bayes risk is given by
3Please see [20] for a detailed description of how (10) is derived.
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Fig. 3. An (N+1)-agent problem is divided into two N -agent problems
depending on Alexis’s decision Ĥ1.
Rp = c10p0
(
1− P Ie,1
)
P
{∑N+1
n=2 Ĥn ≥ L | Ĥ1 = H = 0
}
+ c10p0P
I
e,1P
{∑N+1
n=2 Ĥn ≥ L− 1 | Ĥ1 = 1, H = 0
}
+ c01p1P
II
e,1P
{∑N+1
n=2 Ĥn ≤ L− 1 | Ĥ1 = 0, H = 1
}
+ c01p1
(
1− P IIe,1
)
P
{
N+1∑
n=2
Ĥn ≤ L− 2 | Ĥ1 = H = 1
}
, R0
(
p0(1− P Ie,1) + p1P IIe,1
)
+R1
(
p0P
I
e,1 + p1(1− P IIe,1)
)
,
(11)
where R0 and R1 are specified in (13) and (14) and we define
q0 ,
p0
(
1− P Ie,1
)
p0
(
1− P Ie,1
)
+ p1P
II
e,1
= P{H = 0 | Ĥ1 = 0},
q1 ,
p0P
I
e,1
p0P
I
e,1 + p1
(
1− P IIe,1
) = P{H = 0 | Ĥ1 = 1}. (12)
When Agents 2, 3, . . . , N+1 observe Ĥ1 = 0, their optimal
decision strategy is to minimize the term R0 from (11):
R0 = c10q0P
{∑N+1
n=2 Ĥ
0
n ≥ L |H = 0
}
+ c01(1− q0)P
{∑N+1
n=2 Ĥ
0
n ≤ L− 1 |H = 1
}
, (13)
where the condition Ĥ1 = 0 is embedded in the superscript of
Ĥ0n. Please note that R0 is the same as the Bayes risk of N
agents when the prior probability is q0 and the fusion is done
by the L-out-of-N rule. It implies that the optimal decision
thresholds of Agents 2, 3, . . . , N+1 are the same as those of
N agents with prior probability q0 and the L-out-of-N fusion
rule.
Likewise, when Agents 2, 3, . . . , N+1 observe Ĥ1 = 1,
their optimal decision strategy is to minimize the term R1
from (11):
R1 = c10q1P
{∑N+1
n=2 Ĥ
1
n ≥ L− 1 |H = 0
}
+ c01(1− q1)P
{∑N+1
n=2 Ĥ
1
n ≤ L− 2 |H = 1
}
. (14)
Their optimal decision thresholds are the same as those of
N agents with prior probability q1 and the (L−1)-out-of-
N fusion rule. Fig. 3 depicts the evolution of the problem
corresponding to Alexis’s decision Ĥ1.
Let us find the optimal thresholds ρ0∗2 , ρ
0∗
3 , . . . , ρ
0∗
N+1 in
Problem B0 in Fig. 3. In fact, Problem B0 is also a public
voting scenario; agents observe Ĥ2, Ĥ3, and so on. However,
because of the assumption that the existence of the public
signals does not affect optimal decision thresholds of a team
of N agents for any K-out-of-N fusion rule, we can find
the optimal thresholds as if the agents do secret voting. Since
an agent’s decision is critical only if the other N−1 local
decisions consist of L−1 ones and N−L zeros, the optimal
decision threshold ρ0∗ is the solution to
fY |H(ρ0 | 1)
fY |H(ρ0 | 0) =
c10q0
(
N−1
L−1
) (
P I0e
)L−1 (
1−P I0e
)N−L
c01(1−q0)
(
N−1
N−L
) (
P II0e
)N−L (
1−P II0e
)L−1
=
c10p0
(
1−P Ie
) (
P I0e
)L−1 (
1−P I0e
)N−L
c01p1P IIe
(
P II0e
)N−L (
1−P II0e
)L−1 , (15)
where q0 is replaced by (12). Due to the assumption that ρ∗1 =
λ∗1, P
I
e and P
II
e in (15) are the same as P
I
e and P
II
e in (10).
Comparing (15) to (10), we can find that they have the
same solutions, i.e., ρ0∗i = λ
∗
i . Therefore, the agents should
not change their decision thresholds after observing Ĥ1 = 0.
We can also find the optimal thresholds ρ1∗2 , . . . , ρ
1∗
N+1 in
Problem B1 in Fig. 3 by looking at the N -agent problem
without public signals:
fY |H(ρ1 | 1)
fY |H(ρ1 | 0) =
c10q1
(
N−1
L−2
) (
P I1e
)L−2 (
1−P I1e
)N−L+1
c01(1−q1)
(
N−1
N−L+1
) (
P II1e
)N−L+1 (
1−P II1e
)L−2
=
c10p0P
I
e
(
P I1e
)L−2 (
1−P I1e
)N−L+1
c01p1 (1−P IIe )
(
P II1e
)N−L+1 (
1−P II1e
)L−2 .
(16)
Again, due to the assumption that ρ∗1 = λ
∗
1, P
I
e and P
II
e in
(16) are the same as P Ie and P
II
e in (10). We reach the same
conclusion that the two equations have the same solutions, i.e.,
ρ1∗i = λ
∗
i , by comparing (16) to (10). Thus, the agents should
not change their decision thresholds after observing Ĥ1 = 1.
Consequently, for a team of N+1 agents and any L-out-
of-(N+1) rule, their optimal decision thresholds are the same
whether they observe previous decisions or not.
Corollary 3: Suppose that sharing local decisions does not
change Alexis’s decision rule (i.e., ρ∗1 = λ
∗
1). For any N and
L-out-of-N fusion rule, the existence of the public signals
does not affect optimal decision thresholds of a team of N
agents.
Proof: Use mathematical induction with Theorems 1
and 2.
This result requires the assumption that Alexis uses the same
decision rule in both secret and public voting. This assumption
is trivially true for N = 1 and also true for N = 2 by proof.
In addition, our numerical experiments for N ≤ 9 confirmed
that it is true. Thus, this assumption seems heuristically true.
In particular, we fail to see how Alexis would choose between
increasing or decreasing her decision threshold based on the
existence of public signals.
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Individual correctness vs. team correctness, and belief up-
date vs. fusion rule evolution: One may have the intuition that,
because the public signals are not independent of H , it cannot
make sense for agents to ignore the public signals. Indeed,
if the goal of Agent n is to make a correct decision herself
(ignoring her role in the team) and she observes the public
signal of Agent i before making her decision, she should
not ignore Ĥi. If Ĥi = 0, then Agent n would include the
information in her LRT to make a better choice as follows:
PYn,Ĥi |H(yn, 0 | 1)
PYn,Ĥi |H(yn, 0 | 0)
Ĥn=1
R
Ĥn=0
c10p0
c01p1
. (17)
Since Agent n’s private signal Yn and Agent i’s private signal
Yi are independent given H , so are Yn and Ĥi. Then (17) is
transformed as
fYn |H(yn | 1)
fYn |H(yn | 0)
Ĥn=1
R
Ĥn=0
c10p0P{Ĥi = 0 |H = 0}
c01p1P{Ĥi = 0 |H = 1}
=
c10p0P{H = 0 | Ĥi = 0}
c01p1P{H = 1 | Ĥi = 0}
=
c10q0
c10(1− q0) ,
(18)
where q0 = P{H = 0 | Ĥi = 0}. Agent n’s LRT with two
observations Yn and Ĥi becomes an LRT with one observation
Yn as if she updates the prior probability of H = 0 from p0 to
q0 upon observing Ĥi = 0. More generally, the updated belief
of H = h has a form of P{H = h | observed public signals},
assuming the agents observe conditionally independent private
signals. The updated belief of H = 0 will be higher than the
prior probability if previous agents have chosen 0 and lower
if they have chosen 1.
Return now to the optimization of team performance. In
the proof of Theorem 2, (13) and (14) reveal that the belief is
updated in the same manner when the agents perform group
decision making. The difference is that these formulas contain
fusion rule evolution (depicted in Fig. 3) along with the belief
update. While the belief update is common in the social
learning literature—in fact, central to it—the evolution of the
fusion rule hardly appears in the literature.
The fusion rule evolution arises because, in a public voting
scenario, an agent should hesitate to invalidate the votes of
later-acting agents teammate should of aggregation by voting
and the agents’ observations of all previous decisions. Each
agent can keep a running tally of the numbers of 0 and 1
votes. A large number of 1 votes implies that only a few more
1 votes will determine the team decision to be 1 even before
all agents vote; thus, in order to vote 1, an agent should need a
strong private signal in support of 1 to take the risk of making
later-acting agents’ votes null. By Corollary 3, the effects of
the belief update and fusion rule evolution cancel exactly. A
numerical example is detailed in Fig. 4. Reading that figure
from left to right, for each agent after Alexis, the belief update
is done first and then the fusion rule evolution brings the
optimal decision threshold back exactly to the optimal decision
threshold of Alexis.
In conclusion, while belief updates encourage later-acting
agents to agree with the earlier acting agents (the phenomenon
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Fig. 4. Illustration of the separate effects of belief updates and fusion rule
updates. The diagram depicts decision thresholds for the first three agents in
an example with p0 = 0.25 and the 4-out-of-7 fusion rule. Agents observe
H ∈ {0, 1} corrupted by iid Gaussian additive noises with zero mean and
unit variance, and c10 = c01 = 1. The (p, L/N) label on a marker (• or
◦) indicates that its height represents the optimal decision threshold for prior
probability p and the L-out-of-N fusion rule. Alexis has an initial decision
threshold depending only on the prior probability p0 and the 4-out-of-7 fusion
rule (leftmost ◦). If Britta considers belief updates only, the optimal decision
threshold is changed from Alexis’s decision threshold to a new value that
depends on Ĥ1 (two leftmost •’s). However, after adopting the fusion rule
evolution as well, Britta’s optimal decision threshold returns to equal Alexis’s
decision threshold (center ◦). Similarly, if Carol considers belief updates only,
the four values for (Ĥ1, Ĥ2) lead to three distinct decision thresholds (three
rightmost •’s). After accounting for the fusion rule evolution, Carol’s optimal
decision threshold returns to equal Alexis’s decision threshold (rightmost ◦).
that classically causes herding), decision-making by voting
causes fusion rule evolution as well. This discourages agree-
ment of later-acting agents with the earlier-acting agents. By
proving that the optimal thresholds of the last N agents are
the same in the cases when Ĥ1 = 0, when Ĥ1 = 1, and when
they do not know Ĥ1, it is proved that the effects of the former
and the latter are exactly canceled out.
B. Incomplete Public Signals
We now extend our analysis to scenarios in which each
agent is aware of an arbitrary subset of the previously made
decisions. For example, each agent may observe the public
signal only from its neighbors in a sequence (see Fig. 5a) or the
communication topology may be more arbitrary (see Fig. 5b).
Let us say that agents perform partial public voting when
agents observe proper subsets of precedent local decisions.
Corollary 4: Observing a subset of public signals does not
affect optimal decision rules and performance of a team.
Proof: First, we will show that a team of agents observing
only a subset of public signals (Team A) cannot outperform
a team of the same size that consists of those who observe
full public signals (Team B). The proof is by contradiction.
Let us assume that Team A can outperform Team B using
their optimal decision strategy. Then, since what each agent
in Team A observes is also observed by the corresponding
agents in Team B, Team B can mimic the optimal strategy of
Team A. For Agent n in Team B, all she has to do is ignore
the public signals that Agent n in Team A cannot observe.
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Alexis Britta
H1ˆ H2ˆ
Alexis
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Norah
···
Carol
Diana
H2ˆ
H2ˆ H4ˆ
HN‐1ˆ
H3ˆ
H1ˆ
H1ˆ
Carol Norah···
H3ˆ HN‐1ˆ
(a)
Alexis Britta Norah
H1ˆ
···
H2ˆ HN‐1ˆ
Alexis
Britta
Norah
···
Carol
Diana
H2ˆ
H2ˆ H4ˆ
HN‐1ˆ
H3ˆ
H1ˆ
H1ˆ
(b)
Fig. 5. Examples of partial public voting. (a) Each agent sequentially
observes the decision made by the agent right before her. (b) Each agent
observes the decisions made by her neighbors.
After mimicking the strategy of Team A, the performance of
Team B becomes the same as that of Team A. This contradicts
our assumption. Hence Team A cannot outperform Team B.
Next, let us consider Team A and a team of agents not
observing any public signals (Team C). We can prove that
Team C cannot outperform Team A through similar logic.
Corollary 3 implies that Team C in fact performs as well as
Team B. Therefore Team A is also as good as Teams B and C
with respect to their optimal performances.
The convenience of secret voting emerges especially when
agents cannot observe all public signals. Even though partial
public voting cannot outperform public voting, the former
requires more computations for Bayesian learning. When the
agents observe a subset of public signals, they need to consider
all possible realizations of the public signals that they cannot
observe in order to perform Bayesian learning. For example,
in Fig. 5a, Carol observes Britta’s decision but not Alexis’s
decision. Her updated belief when Ĥ2 = 0 will be computed
as follows:
q03 = P{H = 0 | Ĥ2 = 0}
=
∑
ĥ1
P{H = 0 | Ĥ2 = 0, Ĥ1 = ĥ1}P{Ĥ1 = ĥ1 | Ĥ2 = 0}
=
∑
ĥ1
P{H = 0 | Ĥ2 = 0, Ĥ1 = ĥ1}P{Ĥ1 = ĥ1, Ĥ2 = 0}
P{Ĥ1 = 0, Ĥ2 = 0}+ P{Ĥ1 = 1, Ĥ2 = 0}
.
(19)
This process is more complicated than belief update with the
knowledge of both Ĥ1 = 0 and Ĥ2 = 0, which is just to
compute P{H = 0 | Ĥ2 = 0, Ĥ1 = 0}.
Instead of accepting this complexity, the agents should
ignore the public signals. Since the optimal secret voting
strategy performs equally to the optimal public voting strategy,
it is economical for them to not share any public signals at
all.
IV. AGENTS WITH DIFFERENT LIKELIHOODS
Agents may have private signals that relate differently to
the hypothesis. As one example, this occurs when we model
each agent’s private signal as the hypothesis observed over an
additive noise channel, and the channels have different SNRs.
We could think of the agents with relatively high SNRs as
experts and those with low SNRs as novices. Their decisions
are not equally informative, unlike in the identical-agent case
of Section III. We will show that the public signals are futile
in cases where the fusion rule requires unanimity but useful
in other cases.
Now that the agents’ private signals do not have the same
distributions, the order in which the agents act matters to their
team performance. To distinguish the agents, we name them
in descending order of SNRs: Amy has the highest SNR, Beth
has the second-highest SNR, and so on. However, we keep the
notation that the numbering of agents (and hence the subscript
indices) indicate the order of decision making, i.e., Agent 1
acts first, but may or may not be Amy.
A. AND and OR Fusion Rules
The AND (N -out-of-N ) and OR (1-out-of-N ) rules have a
common feature. The team decision requires unanimity of the
agents of one type or the other: for a team decision of 1
under the AND rule, the agents must unanimously decide 1;
and for a team decision of 0 under the OR rule, they must
unanimously decide 0. We thus call these unanimity fusion
rules. This characteristic gives a special result for these fusion
rules.
Let us consider a team of two agents with the OR rule:
Amy with a higher SNR and Beth with a lower SNR. From
the discussion of the two-agent case in Section III, both Amy
and Beth have one degree of freedom. Suppose Amy makes
her decision first with decision threshold λA , and Beth then
makes her decision with decision threshold λ0B , regardless of
Amy’s decision. Their minimum Bayes risk is
min
λA ,λ
0
B
c10p0
(
P Ie,A +
(
1− P Ie,A
)
P I0e,B
)
+ c01p1P
II
e,AP
II0
e,B .
(20)
Now suppose that they switch their positions: Beth first
makes her decision with decision threshold ρB, and Amy then
makes her decision with decision threshold ρ0A, regardless of
Beth’s decision. Their minimum Bayes risk is now given by
min
ρB,ρ
0
A
c10p0
(
P Ie,B +
(
1− P Ie,B
)
P I0e,A
)
+ c01p1P
II
e,BP
II0
e,A .
(21)
The situation is very similar to the proof of Theorem 1. We
have two nearly identical expressions, (20) and (21), and each
agent has a single decision threshold to vary. This leads to
identical minima achieved with identical decision thresholds.
Specifically, (21) can be rearranged to
min
ρB,ρ
0
A
c10p0
(
P I0e,A +
(
1− P I0e,A
)
P Ie,B
)
+ c01p1P
II0
e,AP
II
e,B .
(22)
Now the only difference between (20) and (22) is
the replacement of (P Ie,A , P
II
e,A , P
I0
e,B , P
II0
e,B) in (20) by
(P I0e,A , P
II0
e,A , P
I
e,B , P
II
e,B) in (22). Each of these 4-tuples is the
combinations of Type I and Type II error probabilities for
Amy and Beth as each agent varies a single threshold; thus,
the achievable 4-tuples are identical. Therefore, the optimal
decision thresholds are also the same:
λ∗A = ρ0
∗
A and λ
0∗
B = ρ
∗
B. (23)
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In conclusion, not only is the public signal useless but also
the agents’ decision-making order does not affect the optimal
team decision. Their optimal strategy is just to adopt the
decision thresholds λ∗1 and λ
∗
2 that minimize the Bayes risk:
(λ∗1, λ
∗
2) = argmin
(λ1 ,λ2 )
{
c10p0
(
1− (1− P Ie,1) (1− P Ie,2))
+c01p1P
II
e,1P
II
e,2
}
. (24)
We can extend this result to N agents as long as the fusion
is performed by the OR rule or the AND rule.
Theorem 5: For a unanimity fusion rule, secret voting is the
optimal strategy even when agents observe private signals with
different SNRs. Specifically, public signals are useless and the
ordering of agents does not affect their optimal decision rules
nor the resulting performance.
Proof: For the OR rule, where the Bayes risk is given by
c10p0
(
1−
N∏
n=1
(
1− P Ie,n
))
+ c01p1
N∏
n=1
P IIe,n, (25)
each agent has a meaningful decision threshold only if all pre-
vious agents declare 0. Otherwise, decisions of the remaining
agents are irrelevant. Thus, without loss of optimality, we can
constrain that the agents optimize their decision thresholds λn
for the case when Ĥ1 = Ĥ2 = · · · = Ĥn−1 = 0 and use the
same decision threshold for any public signals. In fact, they
need not know the public signals; they just need to perform
decision making as if all public signals are 0.
Furthermore, the symmetry in (25) implies that indices of
Agents m and n are interchangeable. Therefore, the ordering
of agents does not affect the optimal values of decision
thresholds and, consequently, the minimum Bayes risk.
For the AND rule, the Bayes risk is given by
c10p0
N∏
n=1
P Ie,n + c01p1
(
1−
N∏
n=1
(
1− P IIe,n
))
, (26)
and we can prove the statement in a similar way.
In general, the solution to minimizing (25) or (26) does not
satisfy λ∗1 = λ
∗
2 = · · · = λ∗N , unlike in Section III. Agents
will use different optimal decision thresholds corresponding
to their SNRs. We are arguing not that the agents should have
the same decision thresholds but that they should keep their
decision thresholds the same in any decision-making position.
Furthermore, each agent should make a decision sincerely
based on her private signal and should not care about public
signals because her vote will count only when all the other
agents vote in a particular way (0 for the OR rule or 1 for the
AND rule).
B. Other Fusion Rules
Optimal decision making is more complex for other fusion
rules due to the increase of degrees of freedom. Even in the
simplest case when three agents make a decision with the
MAJORITY (2-out-of-3) rule, the last two agents have two
meaningful degrees of freedom each. The second agent can
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Fig. 6. Lower bounds of operating regions for different orderings of three
agents, Amy (σ2A = 0.25), Beth (σ
2
B = 1), and Cindy (σ
2
C = 2.25), and the
MAJORITY fusion rule.
have different decision thresholds for Ĥ1 = 0 (λ02 ) and for
Ĥ1 = 1 (λ12 ), and the last agent can also have different
ones for (Ĥ1, Ĥ2) = (0, 1) (λ013 ) and for (Ĥ1, Ĥ2) = (1, 0)
(λ103 ). (The third agent is irrelevant for (Ĥ1, Ĥ2) = (0, 0)
or (Ĥ1, Ĥ2) = (1, 1) because the team decision has been
made without her decision.) Learning from public signals can
be helpful in decision making due to these extra degrees of
freedom, unlike in Section IV-A.
Our symmetric fusion rule always treats all local decisions
with equal weights even though they are made by agents
that experience different SNRs. Thus, the team decision can
be improved by social learning, which inevitably unbalances
weights of local decisions.
Figs. 6 and 7 present quantitative evidence of helpful social
learning. In these examples, we consider additive Gaussian
noises with zero mean and variances σ2n. The noises are
mutually independent but not identically distributed.
In the case of Fig. 6, there are three agents using the MA-
JORITY fusion rule. Amy has the highest SNR (σ2A = 0.25),
Beth has the median SNR (σ2B = 1), and Cindy has the
lowest SNR (σ2C = 2.25). Fig. 6 depicts the optimal reversed
receiver operating characteristic (ROC) curves for all possible
orderings of the actions of the three agents.4 We only need
to consider three orderings because the order of the last two
agents does not matter as we discussed in Section IV-A. The
team’s updated fusion rule after Amy makes a decision will
be the AND or the OR rule, depending on Amy’s decision.
There are two notable things in Fig. 6. First, the reversed
ROC curve of secret voting is above that of public voting
for any ordering. This implies that public voting strictly
outperforms secret voting, regardless of the order in which
the agents make decisions. Second, among the public voting
scenarios, the best is when Beth makes her decision first. Fur-
ther numerical experiments for N = 3 with several different
4As decision threshold parameters are varied with the order of agent actions
fixed, some set of (P IE , P
II
E ) pairs is achievable. We call the lower boundary
of this set the reversed ROC curve.
RHIM AND GOYAL 9
0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
1
P
E
I
P EI
I
 
 
Amy → Cindy → Beth → Daphne
Beth → Cindy → Amy → Daphne
Cindy → Beth → Amy → Daphne
Daphne → Beth → Amy → Cindy
Secret voting
0.1 0.15
0.1
0.15
Fig. 7. Lower bounds of operating regions for different orderings of four
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(σ2 = 2.25), and the 2-out-of-4 fusion rule.
noise variances also show that the team performance is the
best when the agent with the median SNR acts first.
Fig. 7 shows the optimal reversed ROC curves for four
agents and the 2-out-of-4 fusion rule. Again, we need not
compare all 16 orderings. After the first agent makes a
decision, the updated fusion rule will be the 1-out-of-3 rule if
the decision is 1, in which case the ordering of the rest of the
agents does not matter (1-out-of-3 is a unanimity rule), and
the 2-out-of-3 rule if the decision is 0, in which case we infer
that the agent with median SNR should act next. Thus, we
only need to compare four orderings, where the first agent is
varying and the median of the remaining three becomes the
second agent. Fig. 7 shows that the agent with the second-
highest SNR should act first as well as that public voting
always outperforms secret voting.
In this section, we have provided evidence that agents can
exploit social learning to improve their team decision when
the qualities of the private signals vary. The sequence of the
agents also needs to be carefully chosen to achieve the best
team performance.
V. CONCLUSION
A. Summary and Interpretation of Results
We have discussed the utility of social learning in a dis-
tributed detection and fusion system by a team of agents who
have the same decision-making costs. We showed that it is not
a trivial question whether intra-team social learning is useful.
The model is intentionally designed to be simple so that we can
understand fundamentals: agents have no conflicts of interests
and their fusion rule is fixed and symmetric.
When Agent i casts a vote Ĥi as an opinion on the value
of the hypothesis H , except in degenerate situations, this vote
is not independent of H . Thus, when the vote is available to
other agents as a public signal, it is natural for them update
their beliefs about H; this is the basis of the social learning
concept. This paper highlights a countervailing phenomenon
that arises when opinions are aggregated by voting: the running
tally of previous votes changes the effective fusion rule for the
agents who have yet to act. This fusion rule update is a less
frequently explored topic.
When the agents observe conditionally iid private signals,
the effects of the belief update and the evolution of the fusion
rule cancel exactly. Consequently, the optimal performance
with or without public signals is the same; internally flowing
information does not improve the team performance.
When the agents observe signals that are conditionally
independent but not identically distributed, the existence of
public signals may improve team performance, and when it
does, the degree of improvement depends on the order in
which the agents act. We first showed that the 1-out-of-N and
N -out-of-N fusion rules are peculiar in that they essentially
require unanimity among agents: under the 1-out-of-N rule,
all agents must vote 0 for the team decision to be 0; under
the N -out-of-N rule, all agents must vote 1 for the team
decision to be 1. The unanimity rules do not allow a chance for
the agents to specialize their decision thresholds for various
public signals. Social learning can play a role to improve
team decisions as long as the fusion rule is not one of these
unanimity rules.
In examples with Gaussian likelihoods, we showed that
team performance improves when agents with differing ob-
servation SNRs do social learning. With three agents making
a team decision by the MAJORITY fusion rule, it is best for the
agent with median SNR to act first. With four agents using the
2-out-of-4 fusion rule, it is best for the agent with second-best
SNR to act first.
None of our results show that the existence of public signals
makes team performance worse; logically, if being influenced
by public signals would be detrimental, optimal agents would
simply ignore them. We speculate, however, that public signals
may be detrimental because, in human agents, belief updates
overwhelm the decision rule update. In fact, without it being
explained to them, people may not have intuition for the idea
that a good agent does not take lightly the disenfranchisement
of later-acting agents.
B. Limitations and Possible Extensions
Within the scope of our model, an intriguing open problem
is to explain the observed patterns on the optimal order for
agents with differing observation SNRs to act. The optimal
ordering is nontrivial. Our experimentation with Gaussian
likelihoods and up to four agents was extensive, but we do
not know if the results extend to other likelihoods. Are there
systematic ordering rules for larger N?
Our model has several limitations, such as conditional inde-
pendence of private signals, knowledge of the prior probability,
and the agents having no motivation beyond minimization of
the Bayes risk (a team performance criterion). Each of these
merits further study. Perhaps the most interesting extensions
are to the set of fusion rules.
We have assigned an equal weight to each vote in (1) and
hence called the fusion symmetric. Suppose the fusion rule
is subject to optimization. Then one could use the Chair–
Varshney fusion rule [21], which is an algorithm that weights
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each individual vote according to its quality and accumulates
them to compare to an optimally determined threshold. The
effect of social learning in this scenario is an open question.
Our focus on equal weighting was motivated by its preva-
lence in most situations in which human opinions are aggre-
gated by voting, ranging from government elections to juries
to decision-making by committees. In human affairs, unequal
weighting of votes is unusual, except for the extreme cases of
veto power and a single ultimate decision maker.
Having a single ultimate decision maker changes the sit-
uation rather dramatically. With respect to Fig. 2, one may
consider Alexis, Britta, . . . , Mary to be advisers to the decider
Norah, and simplify the fusion rule to Ĥ = ĤN .5 Here the
availability of public signals does improve team performance.
This is similar to the situation studied in [11], where it is
shown that an adviser with an inaccurate prior probability for
H may provide a more helpful public signal to the decider.
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